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(thwarted by someone who is never named, and for reasons that are never ex- 
plained) in certain branches of Italian synthetic geometry, coupled with the at- 
tempt to reappraise the role of Gaetano Scorza in developing algebraic studies in 
Italy, obliges the authors to rethink certain traditional judgments. In this manner, 
they “unhesitatingly” place the intuitionist Klein “among the forerunners of 
modern axiomatic theory” along with Hilbert and , . . Poincare. 
This book seems to be a useful attempt to stimulate debate over basic issues of 
the history of 20th-century mathematics. It is to be hoped that this research will be 
followed by attempts to separate analytically the branches, periods, problems, 
and methods of historiographical research in this wide-ranging and important 
period in the history of mathematics. 
NOTES 
1. This is the thesis of L. Lombard0 Radice and F. Bartolozzi, quoted on page 387 of the work under 
review. 
2. See the interesting work by F. Enriques, “La evolution de1 concept0 de la geometria y  de la 
escuela italiana durante 10s ultimos cincuenta anos,” Reuista matematica Hispano-Americana 2 
(1920), 1-17. 
Penser les mathbmatiques. Sbminaire de philosophie et mathimatiques de L’lbole 
Normale SupCrieure. Edited by J. Dieudonne, M. Loi, and R. Thorn. Paris 
(fiditions du Seuil). 1982. 273 pp. 
Reviewed by John L. Greenberg 
Centre de Recherches Alexandre Koyrk. 12. rue Colbert. 75.002 Paris, France 
The collection of articles under review is another in the series of high-level 
popular works on science, in the “Points: Sciences” series published by editions 
du Seuil. The majority of the articles deal with philosophical issues as these relate 
to contemporary problems in pure and applied mathematics. I confine myself to 
the contributions of historical interest. 
Maurice Caveing investigates the extent to which continuity appears as a basic, 
undefined datum in the works of Euclid and Aristotle. From textual analysis he 
concludes the opposite: both in mathematics and physics, continuity does not 
emerge as an intuitively simple idea, given by immediate experience, but as a 
product of ontological reflection and mathematical conceptualization instead (p. 
164). 
In an article on mathematics and physical reality in the 17th century, Francois 
de Gandt finds that, because of its kinematic flavor, the Newtonian fluxion was 
precisely the idea needed to advance the science of motion. Indeed, motion prob- 
lems played a primary role in the genesis of the fluxional calculus, via the intuitive 
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cqnnections between speed and fluxions (p. 168). However, in disregarding at the 
outset Leibniz’ work (p. 168), the author overlooks a major issue. If we accept his 
instincts, we are then faced with a seemingly paradoxical situation. During the 
Nth century, Leibniz’ Continental followers-including Pierre Varignon, the Ber- 
ncmllis, and Euler-advanced the science of motion by solving difficult problems 
in orbital mechanics governed by central forces, and motions in resisting media- 
ta name only two kinds-using Leibnizian “static” differentials. History some- 
times knocks the bottom out from under even the most compelling philosophical 
“ ntuitions.” 
The author’s bibliography betrays another problem: any writer who thinks of 
Carl Boyer’s pioneering History of the Calculus and Its Conceptual Development 
(1949) as the “best overall study” of the development of the infinitesimal calculus 
(p . 194) is a bit behind the times. Let me add, however, that one of his analogies, if 
m)t completely justified historically, does provide a refreshing alternative to the 
view of Descartes as having “missed” transcendental curves, and, consequently, 
tl!e calculus. Like today’s algebraic geometer, Descartes knew what interested 
him and what didn’t (p. 182)! 
In one of the volume’s most intriguing historical pieces, Jean-Claude Pont 
draws parallels between the evolution of painting, reflected in various artistic 
movements, and developments in geometry, with a view to shedding further light 
011 the rise of topology during the 19th century. The latter is a subject Pont has 
niastered, as is well known. 
Benoit Mandelbrot, famous for his work on the geometry of “fractals,” finds 
alrticipations of his research in the 19th-century ripening of an anti-Euclidean 
revolution. In his view, the revolution not only includes the usual discoveries 
(non-Euclidean geometries), but the space-filling curves and related “pathologi- 
c& findings of Cantor, Peano, and others. The latter fall somewhere between the 
slandard objects of geometry with their well-defined, integral dimensions. In a 
nice play on the “theory ladenness of observations,” Mandelbrot shows how the 
attract notion of fractals becomes concrete, which is simply to say, in his view, 
rendered familiar with usage. In particular, he shows how river networks model 
the sequences of approximations to certain Peano curves. 
The volume’s more philosophical excursions, including Jean Dieudonne on 
“significant” versus “empty” mathematics, Paul Gochet on recursive semantics, 
J!:an-Pierre Descles on the relations between linguistics and mathematics, and 
RenC Thorn on the application of his “catastrophe theory” to scientific theorizing, 
I leave aside. I was struck by Pont’s sensible strategy of abstaining from the 
temptation of trying to argue a directed, a priori cause-effect connection between 
the parallels he draws in his essay. Instead, he assigns to the unconscious a good 
deal of the underlying impulses which motivate simultaneous developments. In 
oloosing his strategy, he wisely reminds us of Piaget’s criticism of philosophy: 
“une option a CtC choisie et il faut la defendre, au lieu qu’on s’approche de la 
v5ritC par approximations successives” (p. 211). 
